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IN THE ,SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM F. SMITH and PATSY 
SMITH, his wife 
Pla~ntiffs and Respondents 
-vs.-
CARROLL REALTY COMPANY, a 
corporation, and NATHANIEL A. 
SMITH 
Defendants and Appellants 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 
8892 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
The parties are referred to as in the court below. 
All italics are ours. 
This is an appeal by defendants from a judgment 
rendered against them and in favor of plaintiffs in the 
sum of $4, 850.00. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Statement of Facts in defendants' brief is con-
fusing and necessitates a restatement of the evidence. 
Plaintiffs are husband and wife. In June of the year 
1950, they purchased a home located at 3031 South 8th 
East Street, Salt Lake City, rtah. Shortly after the 
purchase they listed the hmne for sale with Jackson 
Realty Company which later became Carroll Realty 
Company. Plaintiffs selected Jackson Realty Company 
because their friend, N. A. Smith, was associated with 
the company as a real estate agent (R. 99). 
No offers to purchase the home were submitted until 
early Autumn of 1950. At this time Defendant Smith 
presented to plaintiffs a photograph of a home located 
at Lava Hot Springs, Idaho. The owner of the home 
was Nick Kladis who was interested in exchanging it 
for property in Salt Lake City, Utah. Plaintiffs indicated 
to Defendant Smith they needed additional information 
before considering the transaction. On Decen1ber 8, 1950, 
in the con1pany of defendant Smith, plaintiff William 
F. Smith went to Lava Hot Springs to see the home. 
(R. 104, 134). The parties spent approximately two to 
three hours on the premises and returned to Salt Lake 
City the same evening (R. 103). 
On the return trip the Inerits of the exchange agree-
Inent were discussed. S1nith stated he was not fmniliar 
with the 1narket value of properties in the Lava Hot 
Springs area, and agreed to detennine the value of the 
Kladis property for plaintiffs. Defendant Sn1ith called 
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a Mr. Teeples, the Bishop of the Latter-day Saint Church 
at Lava Hot Springs for the purpose of determining the 
value of said property (R. 175). 
After the trip to Lava Hot Springs offers were sub-
mitted to Kladis through his local real estate agent, a 
Mr. Baird of Fletcher-Lucas Investment Company. On 
January 5, 1951, a meeting of plaintiffs, defendants, Mr. 
Baird and Mr. and Mrs. Kladis was held at the office of 
Fletcher-Lucas Investment Company in Salt Lake. At 
that meeting plaintiff Smith had the following conver-
sation with defendant Smith (R. 107, 108, 109) : 
"Q. When next were you contacted by Mr. Smith, 
by the defendant, Nathaniel A. Smith, with 
respect to this Kladis property? 
A. Periodically, I kept in touch with Mr. Smith. 
However, some time in January, we did meet 
at the office of Fletcher-Lucas. 
Q. Who was present? 
A. There was Mr. Baird, who was the representa-
tive of that firm, Mr. Kladis, Mr. Smith and 
myself. 
* * * 
Q. At that time did you have any discussion with 
Mr. Smith with respect to the property? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you have a discussion alone, or was some-
body else there present? 
A. We had a discussion in a group first, and 
then I had a discussion with Mr. Smith priv-
vately. 
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Q. What was this discussion privately between 
you ancl Mr. Smith~ Relate the conversation. 
A. I asked hlm what he had found out in the 
interim of time, about the property in Idaho. 
Q. (Mr. Dibblee) What did he say; give us the 
conversation. 
A. He said, 'Yes. From all I can determine, it 
looks like a good deal to me.' 
Q. Did he say anything with respect to what his 
opinion was, as to the value of the property? 
A. He said he thought it looked like it would be 
a good deal to him. 
Q. In this conversation did he sa~~ anything about 
the people he had contacted~ 
A. He said he had contacted a reliable source, 
and that he could judge that it would be a 
good deal. 
Q. Did he make any disclosure to you as to what 
this reliable source had said' 
A. No." 
The plaintiff further testified that this conversation was 
as follows (R. 116) : 
"Q. Now, when you talked again, did he make any 
reference to these investigations 1 
A. He 1nade reference that he had investigated-
Q. What did he say~ 
A. He said, ·r have 1nade investigations relating 
to what you asked me to, and all I can learn 
on this, it looks to me like it would be areas-
onable price to allow for that property at 
Lava.' 
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Q. What did you say in reply to that statement~ 
A. I said, 'Nate, you know I rely on you- on 
your judgment- and, if you say it is okay, 
it is okay by me.' " 
After completion of the above conversations plaintiffs ex-
ecuted the Exchange Agreement (Exhibit 1). On Febru-
ary 1, 1951, the warranty deeds and mortgages were 
executed by the parties (Exhibit 2) and each party took 
possession of his respective home. 
In August, 1951, plaintiff listed his acquired property 
for sale with a real estate agency in Pocatello, Idaho. The 
listing price was in the sum of $16,000.00 (R. 112). Plain-
tiff was unable to sell the home and defaulted on the 
mortgage to Mr. Kladis. A foreclosure action was insti-
tuted by Kladis and the property sold at a sheriff's sale. 
In the latter part of February, 1954, plaintiff Smith 
returned to Lava Hot Spring, Idaho, to investigate his 
transaction with Kladis. He contacted residents in that 
community, including Mr. Teeples (R. 117). Upon com-
pletion of this investigation, plaintiffs filed their com-
plaint against defendants. 
The theory alleged in plaintiffs' original complaint 
was fraud. The complaint was amended to allege as f-t 
second cause of action the failure of defendants to exer-
cise the usual and customary skill and diligence of their 
profession. 
Defendant Smith testified he agreed to determine 
the value of the Kladis property. He secured this valua-
tion from Mr. Teeples who was not a real estate agent 
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and who was not familiar with the market value of prop-
erty in Lava Hot Springs. The witness Jensen testified 
that this conduct in determining the value of the Kladis 
property was not in accordance with the standards of 
the profession (R. 165). Defendant Smith testified he 
reported to plaintiffs all material information he secured 
from Mr. Teeples but this was denied by Plaintiff Smith. 
(R. 179, 180). 
In view of this evidence plaintiffs withdrew their 
first cause of action and submitted the matter to the jury 
on the basis of negligence. 
The witness Banning, a real estate agent in Pocatello, 
and who was familiar with the market values of property 
in Lava Hot Springs, Idaho, testified the reasonable value 
of the Kladis property as of February 1, 1951, was be-
tween the sum of $7,000.00 and $8,000.00 (R. 91). The 
defendants' expert witness Sol omen testified the value 
of the Smith property on February 1, 1951, was $19,200.00 
(R. 227). 
The trial court instructed the jury the measure of 
damages in this action was the difference between the 
reasonable market value of the Kladis property and the 
reasonable value of plaintiffs' h01ne. The evidence pre-
sented substantiated the verdict in the sun1 of $3,700.00. 
The third cause of action concerned the refund of the 
real estate commission paid by plaintiffs. 
Plaintiffs respectfully sub1uit that the case was prop-
erly sub1nitted to the jury and the judg1nent should be 
affinned by this court. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE WRITTEN AGREEMENT REQUIRED DEFEND-
ANTS TO DETERMINE VALUES OF THE EXCHANGE 
PROPERTIES. 
POINT II. 
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS IS NOT INVOLVED IN 
THIS CASE. 
POINT III. 
THE DUTY OF DEFENDANTS WAS NOT BASED UP-
ON A VOID CONTRA.CT. 
POINT IV. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO INSTRUCT 
ON CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OR ASSUMPTION OF 
RISK. 
POINT V. 
THE EXCHANGE AGREEMENT DID NOT WAIVE THE 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION. 
POINT VI. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY PRESENTED TO THE 
JURY THE ISSUE OF DEFENDANTS' NEGLIGENCE. 
POINT VII. 
THE PROOF WAS SUFFICIENT AS TO THE PLAIN-
TIFF PATSY SMITH. 
POINT VIII. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN AWARDING PLAIN-
TIFFS THE AMOUNT OF REAL ESTATE COMMISSION. 
POINT IX. 
THE COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANTS' MO-
TION FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
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THE WRITTEN AGREEMENT REQUIRED DEFEND-
ANTS TO DETERMINE VALUES OF THE EXCHANGE 
PROPERTIES. 
The written agreement required defendants to exer-
cise reasonable skill and diligence in the performance of 
their duties as real estate agents and brokers. When the 
proposal to exchange plaintiffs' property for the Kladis 
property was presented to defendants it was their respon-
sibility to become fully informed about the Kladis prop-
erty and· particularly to become properly advised as to 
the reasonable market value of said property. The expert 
witnesses Jensen and Sol omen, both testified that the 
standards and custom of the real estate business require 
this to be done. (R. 173, 209). 
Defendants knew that plaintiffs were relying on them 
to ascertain the value of the Kladis property and on the 
basis of that value to advise plaintiffs as to whether the 
exchange would be beneficial to the1n. This ''"as the sole 
reason defendant contacted ~Ir. Teeples. 
Defendants now contend that the en1ployn1ent agree-
ment did not require them to ascertain the value of the 
Kladis property. The trial court did not give credence to 
this rather novel argu1nent and sub1nitted the n1atter to 
the jury as an issue of fact. 
·under Group 1, Proposition A and B of the Special 
Verdict the trial court presented a~ an issue of fact the 
scope of defendants' e1nploy1nent. The jury found that 
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the scope of defendants' employment agreement did, in 
fact, include the duty to determine the reasonable market 
value of the Kladis property. 
The standards of the real estate profession and the 
conduct by defendants substantiated this finding by the 
jury. 
Under the same group of the Special Verdict the trial 
court properly included the duty of defendants to report 
the results of their inquiry. 
POINT II. 
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS IS NOT INVOLVED IN 
THIS CASE. 
Under Point II of their brief defendants again argue 
that the written Sales Agency Contract did not include 
the duty of defendants to determine the reasonable value 
of the Kladis property, and further that if defendants 
did have the duty, this duty was based upon an oral modi-
fication of the written agreement. Counsel then cites 
authorities that any oral modification is void as being 
within the Statute of Frauds. 
This same argument was presented to the trial court 
in the Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict. 
The trial court disposed of this novel contention in his 
memorandum decision as follows: 
"The defendants claimed that the oral agree-
ment to determine the valuation of the property 
was not supported by consideration, and barred by 
the Statute of Frauds. 
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"The Court tentatively is of the opinion that 
such is the fact, but is of the opinion that the agent 
was bound by the written agreement of employ-
ment to disclose to his principal what he had 
learned concerning the value of the property and 
that a breach in that respect was a breach of the 
written agreement, and on this ground the motions 
are denied." (R. 75) 
It is a well accepted principle of law that the scope 
of employment of a real estate agent encompasses the 
duty to disclose pertinent and material facts. 
In ReiJch v. Christopulos, 256 P. 2d 238, this court 
stated: 
"In undertaking the sale of the property for 
the Reiches, Hill had a duty to represent their 
interest in good faith, to discharge it with reason-
able skill and diligence and to disclose to them all 
pertinent facts which "\vould materially affect their 
interest. As is noted in A1nerican Jurisprudence: 
'The faithful discharge of his duties is a 
condition precedent to any recovery upon the 
part of a broker for the services he has ren-
dered his principal. Thus, he is not entitled 
to compensation if he fails to disclose to his 
principal any personal lmowledge which he 
possesses relative to matters which are or 
may be 1naterial to his employer's interests 
• :!It :!It'" 
An annotation in ~32 ALR 2d 728, discusses the sub-
ject as follo,vs: 
"As pointed out in 8 Aln. Jur. 1038, Brokers, 
Sec. 89, the rule requiring a broker to act with the 
utinost good faith toward his principal places him 
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under a legal obligation to make a full, fair, and 
prompt disclosure to his employer of all facts 
within his knowledge which are or may be material 
to the matter in connection with which he is em-
ployed, which might affect his principal's rights 
and interest of influence his action in relation to 
the subject matter of the employment, or which 
in any way pertain to the discharge of the agency 
which the broker has undertaken; and it is the 
interests of the employer that furnish the criterion 
as to what information is material in the sense that 
it should be communicated by the broker to his 
employer." 
It is admitted that Smith orally agreed to determine 
the value of the Kladis property and in accordance with 
said oral agreement contacted Mr. Teeples and received 
valuable information pertaining to the prospective ex-
change property. The jury found he failed to disclose 
this information to the plaintiffs. It is inconceivable that 
the Statute of Frauds could be used to relieve the defend-
ants from legal responsibility for their failure to dis-
charge their fiduciary duty of full disclosure. The trial 
court correctly ruled the Statute of Frauds has no appli-
cation. 
An interesting case in point is Steiner v. Rowley, 
(Cal.) 221 P. 2d 9. This was an action by plaintiffs to 
secure the amounts paid as commission and secret profits 
to defendants as real estate agents. In count one of their 
complaint plaintiffs alleged defendant was employed 
by them under an oral contract and alleges the violation 
of his duties. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
12 
A general demurrer to this court was sustained by 
the trial court and plaintiffs appealed. Defendants assert-
ed that this court did not state a cause of action because 
the oral agreement was within the Statute of Frauds. 
The trial court in overruling the demurrer stated: 
"The right of the Steiners to recover against 
Rowley on count one of their complaint depends 
upon the applicability of section 1624 of the Civil 
Code to the transaction which is basis of the con-
troversy. That statute reads: 'An agreement 
authorizing or employing an agent or broker to 
purchase or sell real estate for compensation or 
a commission * * *' is invalid unless the same, or 
some note or memorandum thereof, is in writing 
and subscribed by the party to be charged or by 
his agent. The first count states, the Steiners 
contend, a cause of action for the recovery of 
secret profits made by a fiduciary. The purpose 
of section 1624 of the ·Civil Code, they say, is only 
to prevent a broker from recovering a commission 
for services performed under an oral contract. 
As Rowley received his connnission and the con-
tract was fully executed, the form of the agree-
ment is immaterial. Finally, they assert that there 
is a fiduciary relationship between the broker 
and his employer under either an oral or written 
rontract, and a contrary rule would allow the 
statute of frauds to be used as a cloak for fraud. 
Rowley declares that because of the allegation of 
an oral contract between the parties, count one 
fails to state a cause of action. 
"* * * Count one of the Steiners' c01nplaint 
therefore states a cause of artion unless the fact 
that Rowley was e1nployed under an oral contract 
bars a recovery against hin1. 
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"Section 1624 of the Civil Code is applicable 
to the collection by the agent or broker of his 
'* * * cmnpensation or a commission * * *' and 
the enforcement by the principal of the broker's 
agreement, (citing cases) but it has nothing to 
do with the cause of action pleaded by the Stein-
ers. They are not attempting to 'enforce' a con-
tract Inade by Rowley. The commission has been 
paid and the contract for Rowley's services fully 
executed. The cause of action is one to recover 
from a fiduciary his commission and secret profits, 
and the general demurrer to it should have been 
overruled." 
POINT III. 
THE DUTY OF DEFENDANTS WAS NOT BASED UPON 
A VOID CONTRACT. 
Under this point defendants contend that negligent 
performance of a duty based upon a void contract is not 
actionable. This is merely a reargument of Points I and 
II under a different guise. We refer the Court to our 
previous two points for our position. 
POINT IV. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO INSTRUCT 
ON CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OR ASSUMPTION OF 
RISK. 
There can be no question about the fact that a fidu-
ciary relationship existed between the parties. This being 
true, the plaintiffs had the right to rely upon Defendant 
Smith's representation that he had checked into the value 
of the Kladis property and that the prospective trade was 
to plaintiffs' advantage. 
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In Richer v. Burke (Ore.) 34 P. 2d 317, which in-
volved the exchange of properties by residents of differ-
ent states, the court, in discussing the issue of reliance, 
stated as follows: 
"Moreover, it will be recalled that the defend-
ant Burke was the witness' agent. It was Burke's 
duty to fully and frankly inform the plaintiffs con-
cerning this property. The plaintiffs owned no 
duty to him to be on the alert lest he deceive them. 
They were not bound to investigate his statements. 
To the contrary, they would rightfully place con-
fidence in any statements their agent made con-
cerning this property. (Citing cases)". 
In Burgess v. Charles A. Wing Agency, (Ore.) 11 P. 
2d 811, the court stated: 
"Whatever 1nay be the rule requiring investi-
gation where the parties deal at arm's length, it 
is well established that this necessitY does not exjst 
where a relationship of trust or co~fidence exjsti' 
between the parties so that the principal place:' 
reliance upon the trustworthiness of the other." 
Defendants, on page 43 of their brief, refer to an 
annotation at 62 ALR 1357, 1360, as being in support of 
their contention. Counsel omitted a portion of the state-
Inent and did not correctly include within the quotes the 
important portion of the annotation. The correct state-
ment is as follows: 
••Jn the absence of special circumstances giv-
ing the princrpal a right to rely on the a.gent's 
skill and care. the principal has been held to be 
barred frOin recovering for the agent's negligence 
by contributory negligence." 
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In the case at bar plaintiffs questioned defendant con-
cerning the value of the Kladis property. Defendant 
Smith elected to withhold facts and instead gave an opin-
ion "It looks like a good deal to me." (R. 109). In view 
of the fiduciary relationship plaintiff was under no duty 
to cross examine or investigate this statement. 
The jury found that defendants breached their duty 
of full disclosure and that as a result of this violation 
plaintiffs entered into a real estate transaction which 
caused them to suffer damages. This finding was abund-
antly supported by the evidence. 
The authorities cited by defendants are not in point. 
For example, the Cole case involved an action between 
a buyer and seller, not a real estate agent and his client. 
Plaintiff could only be found contributory negligent 
or to have assumed the risks of the transaction if he had 
no right to rely on the representations of his fiduciary. 
The authorities are uniform that under the circumstances 
of this case a fiduciary relationship existed and that plain-
tiff did have a right to rely on said representations. The 
undisputed evidence is that he relied on said representa-
tions to his detriment. Therefore, there was and could be 
no issue of contributory negligence or assumption of risk 
in this case, and the trial court was correct in so holding. 
POINT V. 
THE EX·CHANGE AGREEMENT DID NOT WAIVE THE 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION. 
In the memorandum decision the trial court stated as 
follows: 
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"Point II 
"The defendants argued that the motion 
should be granted because upon the signing of the 
exchange agreement, the plaintiffs waived claims 
against the realtor. The matter being submitted to 
the jury on the theory that the defendants failed 
to disclose an opinion as to the value of the prop-
erty in Idaho, presented an action on which a claim 
could not be waived by contract, and on thi~ 
ground the motions are denied." (R. 75) 
The defendants, on page 45 of their brief, after re-
ferring to the above comment contend that the failure 
to disclose an opinion is fraud and the court must have 
had in mind that a waiver of an action for negligence is 
contrary to public policy. Counsel then cites authorities 
for this proposition. 
We submit that the language used by the trial court 
is a sufficient response to counsel's argument. 
POINT VI. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY PRESENTED TO THE 
JURY THE ISSUE OF DEFENDANTS' NEGLIGENCE. 
Plaintiffs' original c01nplaint was based upon an alle-
gation of fraud and 1nisrepresentation. The complaint 
was amended to allege negligence as a second cause of 
action which was the only issue presented to the jury. 
Dis1nissal of the first cause of action was not an 
abandonment of plaintiffs' only tenable position. The 
evidenrP disclosed defendants breached their fiduciary 
dut~r to disclose valuable inforn1ation to plaintiff. The 
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evidence further disclosed that defendants, as real estate 
agents, failed to use their skill and knowledge before 
expressing an opinion to their client. All of this conduct 
on behalf of defendants was based upon a written agree-
ment between the parties. 
It is immaterial whether this conduct by defendants 
is termed fraud or negligence because it is obviously a 
failure of defendants to perform their legal duty. A label 
cannot change the quality or characteristics of the pro-
duct. 
POINT VII. 
THE PROOF WAS SUFFICIENT AS TO THE PLAINTIFF 
PATSY SMITH. 
The plaintiffs' home which was listed with the Jack-
son Realty Company for sale was owned jointly by the 
plaintiff vVilliam A. Smith and Patsy Smith, his wife. 
The evidence reveals that William A. Smith dealt with 
defendants and with KJadis for himself and for his wife 
as well. Defendants offered no rebuttal evidence as to 
Patsy Smith's rights. But they now undertake to inject 
this hypertechnical contention into the case to confuse 
the issues. We will leave it to this court's good judgment 
whether to sustain the verdict in favor of William A. 
Smith alone or in favor of both plaintiffs. The end re-
sult would be identical. 
POINT VIII. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN AWARDING PLAIN-
TIFFS THE AMOUNT OF REAL ESTATE COMMISSION. 
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The trial court properly directed the jury to include 
as damages the cornmission paid on this transaction. 
Defendants argue the commission was paid to 
Fletcher-Lucas Investment Company but the evidence dis-
closes that the commission was paid pursuant to plain-
tiffs' Sales Agency Agreement. 
In Reich v. Chrvstopulos, 123 U. 137, 266 P. 2d 238, 
the court stated: 
"In undertaking the sale of the property for 
the Reiches, Hill had a duty to represent their in-
terest in good faith, to discharge it with reasonable 
skill and diligence and to disclose to them all per-
tinent facts which would materially affect their 
interest. As is noted in American Jurisprudence, 
( 4 Am. Jur. 1067, Brokers, Sec. 1-!:2): 
" 'The faithful discharge of his duties is a 
condition precedent to any recovery upon the part 
of a broker for the services he has rendered hi~ 
principal. Thus, he is not entitled to compensation 
if he fails to disclose to his principal any personal 
knowledge which he possesses relative to n1atters 
which are or may be n1aterial to his employer's 
interests * * *.' " 
In Baird v. Madsen (Cal.) 13-! P. 2d 885, the court 
stated: 
"It is doubtless true, as pointed out by de-
fendant, that a real estate broker n1ust act in good 
faith in the discharge of his duties as agent; that 
hy misconduct, breach of conduct or wilful dis-
regard, in a material respect. of an obligation im-
posed upon him by the law of agency he nmy for-
feit his right to con1pensation. (Citing cases). To 
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this end it is held that the rule which applies to 
trustees generally governs the relationship be-
tween a real estate broker and his principal. The 
broker is bound to disclose to the principal any 
facts known to him which are material to the trans-
action, and if he takes part in the negotiations he 
is bound to exercise his skill for the benefit of his 
principal; and any concealment from the princi-
pal of material facts known to the agent, or any 
collusion by the latter with a purchaser may op-
erate to forfeit the right of the agent to compensa-
tion for his services (Citing cases), and it matters 
not that there was no fraud meditated and no in-
jury done. The rule is not intended to be remedial 
of actual wrong, but preventative of the possibility 
of it. (Citing cases) Applying the foregoing legal 
principles to the findings on this issue, it would 
seem that the trial court was not unwarranted in 
giving judgment for the defendant." 
See 8 A.J. Sec. 1-12, 13-! ALR 1346, and Reese v. 
Harper, 329 P. 2d -!10. 
The evidence establishes in this case that defendants 
forfeited their rights to receive any compensation for 
their services when they failed to discharge the duties of 
their employrnent. We submit that the better authorities 
all support our position on this issue. 
The case cited by defendants involved a statute pecu-
liar to the State of California and is not controlling in 
this case. 
POINT IX. 
THE COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANTS' MO-
TION FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
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The granting of a motion for a new trial is within the 
discretion of the trial court. This court in Trimble et ux 
v. Union Pacific Stages, 142 P. 2d 674, 677, discussed the 
circumstances under which so-called newly -discovered 
evidence will be considered sufficient to require the 
granting of a motion for a new trial. The court stated: 
"Nor do we believe that the lower court erred 
in refusing to grant a new trial. The evidence 
of witnesses Hess and Halahan \\·as cumulative, 
and it is well settled in this state that such evi-
dence is not ground for a new trial. Klopenstine 
v. Hays, 20 l~tah 45, 57 P. 712, 714, wherein it is 
said: 'It is well settled that, to entitle a defeated 
party to a new trial on the ground of newly-
discovered evidence, it must appear, (1) that he 
used reasonable diligence to discover and produce 
at the forn1er trial the newly-discovered evidence, 
and that his failure to do so was not the result of 
his own negligence; (2) that the newly-discovered 
evidence is not simply cun1ulatiYe; (3) that such 
evidence is not sufficient if it simply be to impeach 
an adverse witness; ( 4) it 1nust be material to the 
issues, and so important as to satisfy the court. 
by reasonable inference, that the verdict or judg-
ment would have been different had the newly-
discovered evidence been introduced at the former 
trial; ( 5) that the defeated party had no oppor-
tunity to make the defense, or was prevented from 
doing so by unavoidable accident. or the fraud or 
improper conduct of the other party, without fault 
on his part.' " (Citing cases) 
In the case at bar the proposed newly-discovered 
evidence pertained to written letters and counter-offers 
in the custody of Fletcher-Lucas Inveshnent Company. 
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Defendants argue that the documents are of such 
a character that the trial court abused its discretion in 
denying the Motion for a New Trial. They contend the 
documents would have an affect upon the verdict because 
they would substantiate the testimony of defendants and 
impeach the testi1nony of plaintiff. Plaintiffs contend 
that these documents are not newly-discovered evidence 
as defined in the rule of the Trimble case for the following 
reasons: 
First, there is no showing that defendants used 
reasonable diligence to discover and produce the newly-
discovered evidence. The affidavit of the witness Baird 
(R. 67) discloses that the evidence was in his office but 
he was unable to locate it for the trial. If counsel felt 
these documents were of such great importance he should 
have requested a continuance. He did not elect this 
remedy and we submit that because his choice was erron-
eous he cannot claim relief from this court by contending 
that the evidence was newly discovered. Second, the 
documents are merely cumulative. Defendant Smith testi-
fied that in his opinion the trip to Lava Hot Springs was 
on the 18th day of December rather than December 8, 
1950, and immediately after the trip plaintiff requested 
him to make a counter-proposal for the Kladis property. 
In his brief counsel argues that these documents would 
substantiate this testimony by Defendant Smith. We 
submit this argument establishes the fact that the evi-
dence is merely cumulative. Third, this evidence is simply 
for the purpose of impeaching plaintiff. Counsel states 
that this evidence would alter the testimony of plaintiff 
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pertaining to the date of the trip to Lava Hot Springs anti 
the question as to whether counter-proposals were sub-
mitted by him. We submit that this argument shows 
that one of the main purposes for its introduction is sim-
ply to impeach an adverse witness. Fourth, that the trial 
court was not satisfied by reasonable inference that if 
these documents had been presented at the time of trial 
the verdict would have been different. 
In the memorandum decision of the court the follow-
ing is stated pertaining to his point: 
"POINT ·vii. 
"A 1notion was made for a new trial on the 
ground that newly discovered evidence would in-
dicate that the plaintiffs signed an agreement on 
the night they returned from Lava Hot Springs, 
which indicated that the plaintiffs had decided 
to make the exchange without waiting for the 
opinion of any Idaho residents. The ease may 
still be presented to the jury on the theory that 
the plaintiffs had decided to go through with the 
exchange, but would have been stopped in the 
procedure if they had learned of the opinion of 
Bishop Teeples in Idaho. 
"On this point the Court is of the opinion that 
the plaintiffs would be very 1nuch weaker, and is 
of the opinion that the plaintiffs testified they did 
not sign any documents on the evening of the re-
turn from Lava Hot Springs. 
"This point may justify the granting of the 
n1otion for a new trial. The Court, ho,vever, under-
stood that counsel would investigate further as to 
the nature of the docu1nents, and the evidence 
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presented with reference to the absence thereof, 
and the ·Court would like to hear additional argu-
ment upon this point at the convenience of coun-
sel." 
We submit that this statement substantiates the 
position of plaintiff as to the materiality and effect of 
these documents. Furthermore, it indicates that the 
trial court was not at all satisfied with the showing of 
defendants on the issue of whether due diligence had been 
exercised in obtaining these documents for the trial. As 
a matter of fact, the docuinents were not newly discovered 
at all because defendants had known of their existence all 
the time. The same diligence exercised before the trial 
that was exercised after the trial would unquestionably 
have resulted in their production. The primary issue as 
outlined by the court is whether defendants related to 
plaintiffs the information secured by him from the wit-
ness Teeples. These documents would have no effect 
upon that issue. 
The documents now claimed to be newly-discovered 
would not alter the fact that defendant agreed to deter-
mine the value of the Kladis property. This conclusion 
is apparent regardless of the date the defendant agreed 
that he would make the investigation for plaintiffs. The 
documents now claimed to be newly-discovered evidence 
do not alter the effect of whether defendant after con-
tacting the witness Teeples related the entire substance of 
his conversation with him to the plaintiffs. At the trial 
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the plaintiff testified he did not receive this informa-
tion and defendant testified that he did give the informa-
tion to plaintiffs. The jury was the sole judge of the 
credibility of these witnesses and these documents would 
not affect this decision. 
Counsel argues that these documents would have 
affected the credibility of Plaintiff Smith but we submit 
this contention is purely speculative. The trial court 
in denying the motion for a new trial has held otherwise. 
The instructions contained in group four of the 
Special Verdict concerned the issue as to whether plain-
tiffs received the information before executing the Ex-
change Agreement. We contend, as the trial court ruled, 
that these so-called newly-discovered documents would 
have had no effect upon the jury in their deliberation 
on this important point of the Special Y erdict. 
In considering further statements contained in de-
fendants' brief counsel states that these documents would 
substantiate the position of defendant S1nith that he was 
making the inquiry to the witness Teeples as an accmpmo-
dation to plaintiff and that plaintiff Smith did not rely 
on the report. 
Again, it is our position that the obtaining of the 
information was not an accon1n1odation but a duty im-
posed upon defendants in exercising the reasonable skill 
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and diligence common in their profession. The statement 
by counsel that these documents would prove by a pre~ 
ponderance of the evidence that plaintiff did not rely on 
the report is without merit. The record now before this 
Court is full of statements by both Defendants that De-
fendant Smith did not convey the information he secured. 
This testimony was not believed by the jury and the 
assumption by counsel that these documents would alter 
this finding is without merit. We submit that the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion. 
SU~1~IARY AND CONCLUSION 
This case was nothing more than an action against 
a real estate agent for violating the duties of his employ-
ment. 
The action was predicated on the theory that defend-
ants as real estate agents and brokers had the duty under 
the circumstances of this case to determine the reasonable 
value of property located in the State of Idaho. The de-
fendants in discharging this responsibility failed to use 
the reasonable skill and diligence common to their pro-
fession. As a result of their failure plaintiffs exchanged 
property correctly valued at $19,200.00, subject to a $7,-
500.00 mortgage, for property in Idaho, incorrectly valued 
at $15,500.00, but whose actual value was between $7,-
000.00 and $8,000.00. The jury correctly found plaintiffs' 
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damage to be $3,700.00, plus $1,150.00 real estate com-
mission, or a total damage of $4,850.00. 
We respectfully submit that the trial court, in deny-
ing defendants' Motion for a New Trial and Judgment 
Notwithstanding the Verdict was proper and in accord-
ance with the instructions given and the damage proven 
at the trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RA \YLIXGS, \Y ALLACE, 
ROBERTS & BLACK 
RICHARD C. DIBBLEE 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and 
Respondents 
530 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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